What UK Thinks EU

DOES SCOTLAND WANT A DIFFERENT KIND OF BREXIT?

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The UK in a Changing Europe

**NatCen** Social Research that works for society

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Does Scotland Want a Different Kind of Brexit?

While voters in Scotland support many elements of a 'soft' Brexit, they back a 'hard' Brexit on immigration.

FREE TRADE

93% IN FAVOUR   3% OPPOSE

IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS SAME FOR EU AS FOR NON-EU

64% IN FAVOUR   22% OPPOSE

Attitudes towards Brexit in Scotland are only slightly different from those across Britain as a whole.

65%

65%

IN FAVOUR OF BANKS IN EU/BRITAIN PROVIDING SERVICES TO BOTH

72%

70%

IN FAVOUR OF BRITS LIVING/WORKING IN EU TREATED THE SAME AS NON-EU

Scotland is almost evenly divided on whether, given the UK-wide vote to remain, it should be expected to leave the EU or not.

47%   **51%**

BELIEVE SCOTLAND SHOULD   **BELIEVE SCOTLAND SHOULD NOT**

BE EXPECTED TO LEAVE, GIVEN THE UK VOTE

Most voters think that the rules on immigration and trade between Scotland and the EU should be the same as those in England and Wales.

RULES BETWEEN EU & SCOTLAND SHOULD BE THE SAME AS ENGLAND/WALES

62% FOR TRADE   **62% FOR IMMIGRATION**

INTRODUCTION

Britain is now set to leave the European Union. On March 29th the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, formally notified the EU, in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, that the UK proposed to withdraw. In so doing she was implementing the 'will of the people' as reflected in the UK-wide outcome of the referendum on the country's membership of the EU held on June 23rd last year.

However, in Scotland a majority of those who participated in the referendum voted to Remain in the EU. The outcome north of the border, where 62.0% voted to Remain and only 38.0% to Leave, contrasted sharply with the result in England and Wales, where only 46.7% voted to Remain while 53.7% voted to Leave. Given this divergence we might expect the balance of opinion in Scotland on the kind of Brexit deal that the UK should be seeking is very different from that in the rest of the UK.

That certainly seems to have been the assumption under which the Scottish Government has been operating in recent months. In December it published a white paper in which it proposed that the UK as a whole should be seeking to remain in the EU single market and that it should continue to adhere to the freedom of movement provisions of the European Union. It also proposed that even if the UK were to be outside the single market and no longer observing the freedom of movement provisions, Scotland could and should be able to do so, even while remaining part of the UK (Scottish Government, 2016). In short, the Scottish Government was suggesting that the UK might have a variegated relationship with the EU, with some parts having a closer relationship than others.

Even when they were originally published, these proposals looked likely to be at odds with the outlook of the UK government. A speech the Prime Minister had given at the Conservative Party conference in October had already signalled that ending freedom of movement would be one of her top priorities (May, 2016). That impression was certainly confirmed by the contents of a further speech given by Mrs May in January in which she made it clear that the UK government not only wished to end freedom of movement, but also accepted that, given the EU's view that freedom of movement is an integral feature of the single market, the UK would have to leave the single market too (May, 2017). As a subsequent white paper made clear, the UK government would instead seek to secure an 'ambitious and comprehensive Free Trade Agreement' with the EU (HM Government, 2017).

This divergence of view about what kind of Brexit the UK in general and Scotland in particular should be seeking has now been widened into a broader argument about how Scotland should be governed. With little apparent sign that the UK government might be willing to try to bridge the gap between its stance on Brexit and that of the Scottish Government, on March 13th the First Minister announced that she was now minded to try to hold a second referendum on whether Scotland should become an independent country, and to do so in autumn 2018 or spring 2019, once the terms of the proposed deal between the UK and the EU were known (Sturgeon, 2017). While any majority vote in favour of independence could not stop Scotland's exit from the EU along with the rest of the UK at the end of March 2019, it might facilitate a relatively speedy re-entry into the single market, if not necessarily into the EU itself. Although the UK government had already made it clear that it was not inclined to acquiesce to any such demand, on March 28 the Scottish Parliament passed a motion requesting that the UK Parliament should make an order under Section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998 that would give Holyrood the authority to hold such a referendum. At the time of writing there is a stand-off between the UK and the Scottish Government about whether and when a second referendum on Scottish independence should be held.

Despite the fact that the divergence about the appropriate shape of Brexit has instigated what some have called a 'constitutional crisis' over the prospect of a second independence referendum, to date there has been very little polling on what kind of Brexit voters in Scotland would actually

like to see. This briefing tries to help fill that gap. It provides the first in-depth examination of attitudes in Scotland towards a number of the issues that will have to be settled during the Brexit negotiations. At the same time, it presents a systematic comparison of attitudes in Scotland with those across Britain as a whole, and thus gives us an insight into whether Scotland does or does not want a different kind of Brexit from the rest of Britain.

THE DATA

Our evidence comes from a unique survey conducted by ScotCen Social Research between 5th February and 2nd March 2017. The respondents to the survey were first interviewed for either the 2015 or the 2016 Scottish Social Attitudes (SSA) survey. SSA is a high-quality annual survey for which potential respondents are selected wholly at random (Lubian et all., 2016; Scottish Government, 2017). All of the 2,508 people who participated in either the 2015 or 2016 survey were asked at the end of their interview whether they would be willing to take part in further research. Of this group, 2,072 indicated that they were willing to be re-contacted, of whom 859 (or 42%) answered the set of questions being reported here, mostly via the internet but where necessary over the phone. The data have been weighted to take account of known differences between those who did and did not respond to the follow-up survey, as well as to ensure that the sample reflects the known characteristics of the adult Scottish population. Note that as the franchise for the EU referendum consisted of those aged 18 and over, those aged 16 and 17 (who were included in the sample for the first time in the 2016 SSA survey) are not included in the sample for which the results are reported here.

This Scottish survey was conducted at exactly the same time as a parallel Britain-wide survey that asked many of the same questions. This Britain-wide survey interviewed a sample of 2,322 people who were first contacted as part of the 2015 or 2016 British Social Attitudes survey and who agreed to be re-contacted to participate in further research. Further details are to be found in Curtice (2017a). As these Britain-wide data have been collected using exactly the same methodology as our Scotland-only exercise, we can undertake a systematic comparison between attitudes in Scotland in particular and those across Britain as a whole. However, it should be noted that two of the questions included in our Scottish survey were asked in an earlier round of Britain-wide interviewing conducted in September and October last year rather than in the most recent round. Thus in those instances our comparison will be with the figures obtained by that earlier Britain-wide research (Curtice, 2016).

This is the first time that survey research has been undertaken in this way in Scotland. The approach attempts to combine the relative speed and efficiency of the internet with the strengths of traditional high-quality survey research. Thus, on the one hand the survey has been conducted more quickly than would be possible if interviewing were conducted face to face, but, on the other hand, by undertaking the fieldwork over as much as a four-week period, considerable effort is still made to reach those who are not easily available for interview. Similarly, using the internet helps to reduce cost, but equally an effort is made to interview by phone those who cannot or will not respond via the internet. Meanwhile, because respondents are originally selected for interview at random (and for a survey that was not particularly about politics) the exercise is rather more successful than many polls at securing the participation of those who do not vote.

Not that our sample is perfect. According to our respondents' self-reports 66.5% of those who participated in the EU referendum voted to Remain, compared with the 62% that actually did so. Meanwhile 52% stated that they voted No to independence in the September 2014 independence referendum, a little below the 55% that actually voted to stay in the UK. It always needs to be borne in mind that the figures in this report are subject to the chance variation that is inherent in all polling, but these comparisons with the actual outcomes of the EU and independence referendums give good reason to believe that the broad contours of our findings should be a reasonable reflection of the views of those living in Scotland.

THE QUESTIONS

Much of the polling about Brexit to date has focused on one issue in particular, that is, whether the UK government's principal objective should be to maintain free trade, and thus perhaps still remain part of the single market, or whether it should be to try to end freedom of movement, at least as currently operated. However, we should not assume that public opinion is structured according to the trade-offs that political elites think exist. Perhaps voters do not necessarily accept that these two objectives, free trade and abandoning freedom of movement, are incompatible in the way that the EU does (Cadman and Tetlow, 2016). Meanwhile, if we focus on such a broad and in some respects rather abstract issue, we are open to two risks. The first is that we assume that people know what is meant by a 'single market' or 'freedom of movement', or indeed a 'customs union'. Although the debate about Brexit means that these terms have increasingly become common currency in political discourse, it is still not clear that we should make this assumption. The second risk is that we ignore the wide range of other ways in which the EU affects the lives of ordinary voters, including in ways that have a more immediate and visible impact on people and about which, perhaps, they are more likely to have clear views.

Thus, for the most part, in the research we report here, most of the questions simply asked respondents whether a particular proposition should or should not form part of the Brexit deal between the UK and the EU. In so doing, an attempt has been made to frame all of the propositions in everyday language, with all technical language avoided. In addition, we asked about a number of issues that can affect voters' everyday lives ranging from whether they think they should have to go through customs control on re-entering Britain from the EU to whether British phone companies should have to adhere to EU regulations on the cost of mobile phone calls made abroad. Some of the propositions that we put to respondents are ones that might be characterised as forming part of a 'hard' Brexit, while others are ones that might be thought to be indicative of a preference for a 'soft' Brexit. At the same time, it will be seen that we also make our own distinctive contribution to addressing attitudes towards the potential trade-off between access to the single market and immigration control.

SOFTLY, SOFTLY?

Our mixture of 'soft' and 'hard' propositions were interspersed with each other when presented to respondents in the questionnaire, though here we will report them separately. The whole set of propositions was introduced as follows:

> **Following the decision to leave the European Union, the UK will have to negotiate a new agreement with the EU. For each of the following things, to what extent would you be in favour or against it being part of that agreement?**

The specific soft Brexit propositions that we included in the Scotland only survey were as follows:

> **Allowing banks located in EU countries to provide services to people living in Britain while allowing British banks to provide services to people living in the EU**

> **Allowing companies based in the EU to sell goods and services freely in Britain in return for allowing British companies to sell goods and services freely in the EU**

> **Allowing boats from the EU to fish in British waters in return for allowing British boats to fish in EU waters**

Requiring British-owned airlines to follow EU rules that require them to pay compensation to passengers who have been seriously delayed

Britain continuing to follow EU regulations which set minimum standards for the quality of the water at beaches where people swim

Britain continuing to participate in EU programmes for funding cross-national university research

Requiring British mobile phone companies to follow EU regulations that limit what they can charge customers for calls made abroad

Included in our items are references to three sectors of economic activity where there are particular concerns about the possible implications of leaving (or staying in) the EU – universities (in respect of the funding of research), the City (in respect of 'passporting', that is, the ability of UK banks to do business across the EU) and fishing (where activity in Scottish and UK waters is primarily regulated by the EU under the Common Fisheries Policy). The last of these is, of course, particularly important to some ports in the North East. Also included are references to three aspects of EU regulation that might be thought to have a particular impact on ordinary voters, that is, the quality of the sea water on Britain's beaches, the rules that require airlines to compensate passengers for severe delays, and the regulations that mean that, as from this summer, mobile phone users will not be charged extra for using their device in another EU country. At the same time, we refer to one of the key components of being part of the single market, that is, allowing tariff-free trade in goods and services between Britain and the EU.

Table 1 Attitudes towards Possible Contents of a 'Soft' Brexit

	In Favour	Neither	Against
	%	%	%
Free trade	93	4	3
Mobile phone charges	75	15	10
Swimming water	75	13	11
Airline delays	73	15	10
University research	72	15	12
Bank passporting	65	26	8
Common fisheries	52	16	31

Table 1 suggests that most of these potential components of a deal with the EU are relatively popular with voters in Scotland. There is virtually a consensus in favour of the idea that EU companies should be able to trade freely in Britain in return for British companies being able to trade freely in the EU. Few oppose either allowing banks to operate freely across the UK and the EU, although in this instance around one in four are not quite sure whether this is a good idea or not. In short, most voters see little reason why free trade between the UK and the EU should not continue. Meanwhile, around three in four back the maintenance of the various elements of consumer and environmental protection about which we asked, while only around one in ten are against retaining the current EU framework on mobile phone calls, airline compensation and the quality of the sea water on beaches.

There is also seemingly widespread support for continued participation in EU-wide programmes of university research (72% are in favour). As we might have anticipated, however, there is rather less support for continued involvement in a Common Fisheries Policy that some argue has been deleterious to the fishing industry in Scotland. Even so, just over half still seem to support the principle that fishing boats from the EU should continue to have access to Scottish/British waters in return for continued access to EU waters for boats from Britain, while a little under a third would be against such an exchange.

NOT SO 'SOFT' AFTER ALL?

At this point it would seem that in proposing a relatively 'soft' Brexit, the Scottish Government's stance reflects the mood of voters in Scotland. Indeed, in most cases the level of support for maintaining a common regulatory and trading framework is rather higher than the level of support for remaining in the EU in the referendum vote. However, mindful of our warning that we cannot assume that voters necessarily view Brexit in the way that policy makers do, we should examine how people responded to the various 'hard' Brexit propositions that we put to them before coming to any conclusions. These propositions were as follows:

Requiring people from the EU who want to come to live here to apply to do so in the same way as people from outside the EU

Reintroducing customs checks on people and goods coming to Britain from the EU

Ending the ability of the EU to decide the maximum number of hours people in Britain can be expected to work

No longer requiring farmers in Britain to follow EU regulations on the use of pesticides

No longer allowing people from Britain who are visiting a EU country to get health treatment for free

Requiring people from Britain who want to live and work in a EU country to apply to do so in the same way as anybody else from outside the EU has to do.

Ending the ability of the EU to determine the minimum level of annual leave to which workers in Britain are entitled

No longer allowing migrants from other EU countries to claim any welfare benefits in Britain

Three of our items refer to immigration. We asked both whether Britain should no longer make it easier for EU migrants to enter the UK than it is for non-EU migrants to do so, and whether British citizens seeking to move to an EU country should have to go through the same process as non-EU citizens. In addition, we address whether EU migrants in the UK should be able to access welfare at all. Two of our items refer to aspects of EU labour market regulation, that is, setting maximum hours of work and minimum entitlement to annual leave, while we also refer to another feature of EU environmental protection, the use of pesticides. Meanwhile we also ask about the re-imposition of customs checks (which is a likely consequence of leaving the EU Customs

Union as the UK government now appears minded to do) and ending the ability of British citizens to access free health treatment when visiting a EU country. Together with our question on how potential British migrants to the EU should be treated, this last item enables us to assess how voters in Britain respond to the possibility that they might no longer have some of the rights that they currently enjoy as EU citizens.

Table 2 Attitudes towards Possible Contents of a 'Hard' Brexit

	In Favour	Neither	Against
	%	%	%
Treat British emigrants like non-EU migrants	72	10	17
Customs checks	65	12	22
Treat EU immigrants like non-EU migrants	64	12	22
No migrant welfare	59	12	28
End maximum working hours limits	46	18	36
End minimum annual leave	44	17	38
End EU pesticide regulations	31	20	47
No free health for British visitors	30	19	49

Those of our items that refer to immigration and border control, at least, all prove to be relatively popular. Not only do almost two-thirds think that potential EU migrants to Britain should have to apply to come to Britain in the same way that potential migrants from outside the EU have to do, but just over seven in ten believe that British citizens who wish to live and work in another EU country should also have to apply like anyone else. Meanwhile, around three in five would also deny EU migrants any access to welfare. In short, there is little sign here that voters in Scotland wish to retain the current freedom of movement provisions of the EU. To that extent at least the Scottish Government's vision of the kind of Brexit that should be sought seems to be at variance with the mood of voters in Scotland.

This apparent wish for immigration control is also accompanied by considerable support for the introduction of customs checks, even though such checks might be thought to be potentially inimical to free trade. Nearly two-thirds back this idea, presumably because such checks are thought to help preserve the security afforded by border controls. Rather less popular, in contrast, is ending adherence to EU regulation of employees' working hours and annual leave, both of which possibilities are supported by well under half of voters (though supporters are still rather more numerous than outright opponents, who constitute somewhere between a third and two-fifths of all voters). However, almost a half oppose both no longer requiring farmers to comply with EU regulation of pesticides, an outlook that seems broadly consistent with the attitudes towards environmental control of bathing water we reported earlier, while much the same proportion oppose ending the access that British citizens currently have to urgent health care when they are elsewhere in the EU. It would seem that while most voters are happy to lose their right to live and work elsewhere in the EU, there are other rights, such as access to health care, that many would still like to enjoy.

THE TRADE-OFF

It would seem then that, as we suggested might be the case, voters' attitudes towards Brexit in Scotland are not necessarily shaped in the way that might be anticipated from the contours of the debate amongst policy makers. On the one hand, there would appear to be near universal support for free trade. But, on the other hand, there is also widespread support for ending freedom of movement. Still, it may be the case that, during the negotiations with the EU, the UK will be faced with a trade-off between how wide-ranging a free trade deal it can secure and how much control of EU migration it can achieve. In those circumstances where do people in Scotland think the priority should lie – with maintaining free trade or securing freedom of movement?

Our attempt at identifying where the balance of opinion on this issue rests assumes, as we have seen to be the case, that most voters are in favour of free trade and that thus the key issue is whether or not they might be willing to accept free movement if the EU were to make this a requirement of any agreement on free trade. Our question reads as follows:

It has been argued that when Britain leaves the EU, British firms will only be allowed to continue to sell goods and services freely to people in the EU if people from the EU are still free to come here to live and work.

Do you think Britain should or should not allow people from the EU to freely come here to live and work in return for allowing British firms to sell goods and services freely in the EU?

Definitely should allow people from the EU to come here to live and work

Probably should allow people from the EU to come here to live and work

Probably should not allow people from the EU to come here to live and work

Definitely should not allow people from the EU to come here to live and work

As Table 3 shows, voters in Scotland are inclined to accept such a deal. As many as 61% say that Britain should 'definitely' or 'probably' allow people from the EU to come here to live and work in return for allowing British firms to trade freely in the EU, while only 37% say that it 'definitely' or 'probably' should not. Thus while most voters in Scotland would prefer to see an end to freedom of movement, a majority might be willing to accept it in return for free trade. Note, though, that around a half (52%) say that their preference is a probable rather than a definite one, suggesting that the precise circumstances and content of any such deal could matter to voters' willingness or otherwise to accept it.

Table 3 Attitudes towards allowing EU freedom of movement in return for UK access to free trade

Allow people from EU freely to come and live and work in return for allowing UK firms to trade freely with the EU?	%
Definitely should	30
Probably should	31
Probably should not	21
Definitely should not	16

BUDGETARY MATTERS

One of the most controversial claims made during the EU referendum was the Leave campaign's suggestion that the UK would have £350 million a week more to spend on the NHS if it left the EU. Amongst the assumptions that this calculation made was that, following Brexit, the UK would no longer be making any kind of financial contribution to the EU budget. However, if the UK is still to participate in, for example, future EU-wide programmes for funding university research, a possibility we have seen a majority of voters in Scotland appear to support, it will be expected to make a contribution to the cost of those programmes, a point that the UK government appears to have accepted in its white paper on Brexit (HM Government, 2017, para. 8.51).

In order to ascertain whether people in Scotland are in favour or against the UK still having some kind of financial relationship with the EU, we asked the following question:

> **Which of the following comes closest to your view about Britain making payments into the EU Budget once it leaves the EU?**
>
> **Britain should not make any payments into the EU Budget**
>
> **Britain should only make payments for specific EU programmes, such as university student exchanges or grants for small businesses, in which it decides to participate**
>
> **Britain should make a regular payment into the general EU Budget**

Britain only making payments for specific EU programmes is by far the most popular option, being supported by no less than 65%. Only 21% feel that the UK should not be willing to make any kind of financial contribution at all, although at the other end of the spectrum just 12% believe the UK should still be making a regular contribution to the EU budget after Brexit. Of course, there is no guarantee that any two voters will agree on the programmes in which the UK should get involved, and the wording of our question might in any event be thought to imply no more than a quite restricted financial relationship with the EU, but it would seem that voters in Scotland are not necessarily insistent that the UK should not have any financial relationship with the EU at all.

REMAIN AND LEAVE VOTERS

So far we have looked at attitudes towards the shape of Brexit amongst voters in Scotland in general. However, if any attempt is to be made to reflect the different outcome of the referendum in Scotland as compared with the rest of the UK, it might be felt that the views of those north of the border who voted to Remain are of particular interest and importance. It is their majority vote after all that has been overturned by the UK-wide vote to Leave. Certainly, much of the

commentary about what the shape of Brexit should be assumes that the views of Remain and Leave voters are rather different from each other. But is this the case?

Table 4 shows separately the level of support for our various potential constituents of a soft Brexit amongst those who voted Remain in the EU referendum and those who voted Leave. It certainly suggests that those who voted Remain are rather keener than those who backed Leave on maintaining a relatively close relationship with the EU. Even so, that does not necessarily mean that their views are wholly at odds with the preferences of those who wish to leave the EU. For in most cases a majority of Leave voters also support the proposition in question, albeit that the proportion in favour is often around 20 points lower than amongst those who voted Remain. The only instance where over half of Remain voters are in favour of the proposition in question but less than half of Leave voters are is in respect of mutual fishing rights, which, as we have already seen, is the least popular of the soft Brexit propositions that we put to respondents.

Table 4 Support for Possible Contents of a 'Soft' Brexit by EU Referendum Vote

% in favour of	EU Referendum Vote		
	Remain	Leave	Difference (Remain-Leave)
Free trade	95	92	2
Mobile phone charges	80	60	20
Swimming water	83	59	24
Airline delays	79	62	17
University research	78	59	19
Bank passporting	68	61	7
Common fisheries	56	40	16

There are, though, rather bigger disagreements between Remain and Leave voters over our hard questions about immigration and border control. As Table 5 shows, over four in five Leave voters think that potential EU migrants to Britain should have to apply to come here in the same way that a non-EU migrant has to do, that British citizens who wish to move to the EU should have to do the same, and that there should be customs checks at the UK border. In contrast, support for these propositions is in each case between 25 and 30 points lower amongst those who voted Remain. Nevertheless, we should note that even amongst Remain voters somewhat over a half are in favour of restrictions on freedom of movement and of the introduction of customs controls. It seems that even amongst this important group of voters in Scotland there is only minority support for maintaining freedom of movement.

Table 5 Support for Possible Contents of a 'Hard' Brexit by EU Referendum Vote

% in favour of	EU Referendum Vote		
	Remain	Leave	Difference (Leave-Remain)
Treat British emigrants like non-EU migrants	61	86	25
Customs checks	52	82	30
Treat EU immigrants like non-EU migrants	53	81	28
No migrant welfare	49	79	30
End maximum working hours limits	37	57	20
End minimum annual leave	37	48	11
No free health for British visitors	27	40	13
End EU pesticide regulations	23	41	18

On issues other than immigration and borders the differences between Remain and Leave voters are rather less pronounced. As a result, even amongst Leave voters no more than two in five believe that British citizens should not be able to access free health care when visiting abroad or that farmers should no longer have to keep to EU rules on the use of pesticides. Meanwhile, although nearly three-fifths of Leave voters think that the EU should no longer be able to impose a limit on the number of hours that an employee can be expected to work, slightly less than half say the same about the regulation of minimum annual leave. Still, in each case Remain voters are even less keen on the idea. For the most part Remain voters in Scotland can, it seems, be said to be opposed to a 'hard' Brexit - except on the crucial issues of immigration and border control.

Even so many Remain voters would still be willing to accept freedom of movement in return for free trade. Just over three-quarters (76%) state that Britain should either 'definitely' or 'probably' accept such a deal, while less than a quarter (23%) say that it 'definitely' or 'probably' should not. In contrast, only one in three of those who voted Leave say they are inclined to support such a compromise. This contrast provides further evidence that immigration appears above all to be the issue that most divides Remain and Leave voters in Scotland.

Table 6 Attitudes towards allowing EU freedom of movement in return for UK access to free trade by Referendum Vote

Allow people from EU freely to come and live and work in return for allowing UK firms to trade freely with the EU?	EU Referendum Vote	
	Remain	Leave
	%	%
Definitely should	43	11
Probably should	33	22
Probably should not	18	23
Definitely should not	5	41

As we might anticipate, Leave voters are also more likely than their Remain counterparts to oppose Britain making any kind of contribution to the EU Budget. Just over one in three Leave voters (37%) take that view, compared with just 11% of Remain supporters. However, this still means that those who oppose any kind of financial payments to the EU are in the minority amongst Leave supporters. The most popular option amongst this group (59% are in favour), as in the case of Remain supporters (71%), is that the UK should only make contributions to those EU programmes in which it continues to participate. Conversely, even amongst Remain supporters only 16% think the UK should continue to make regular payments into the EU budget (while just 3% of Leave voters are of that view).

YES AND NO VOTERS

The First Minister's decision to call for a second referendum because the UK government appears to back a harder Brexit than the Scottish Government believes is in Scotland's interests might be thought to be based on the assumption that there is a link between people's attitudes towards independence and their views about the kind of Brexit that they would like to see. In particular, we might think that those who voted Yes to independence in the September 2014 independence referendum are more likely to prefer a 'soft' Brexit than are those who voted No.

However, previous survey research has also pointed out that, despite the SNP's long-standing advocacy of 'independence in Europe', a substantial minority of those who voted Yes to independence went on to vote to Leave the EU in the Brexit referendum in June 2016 (Curtice, forthcoming). Our survey confirms this finding. As many as 35% of those who say they voted Yes to independence report having voted to Leave the EU – indeed, in our sample the proportion of Yes voters who voted Leave is not (statistically) significantly different from the proportion of No voters who did so (32%). This might be thought to cast some doubt on whether people's views about the merits of independence do necessarily correspond in any way with their views about Brexit.

Table 7 Support for Possible Contents of a 'Soft' Brexit by Independence Referendum Vote

	Independence Referendum Vote		
% in favour of	Yes	No	Difference (Yes-No)
Free trade	94	95	-1
Mobile phone charges	80	73	7
Swimming water	78	74	4
Airline delays	78	72	6
University research	76	70	6
Bank passporting	68	67	1
Common fisheries	53	50	3

Table 8 Support for Possible Contents of a 'Hard' Brexit by Independence Referendum Vote

	Independence Referendum Vote		
% in favour of	Yes	No	Difference (No-Yes)
Treat British emigrants like non-EU migrants	66	74	8
Customs checks	57	68	11
Treat EU immigrants like non-EU migrants	61	66	5
No migrant welfare	52	66	14
End maximum working hours limits	45	47	2
End minimum annual leave	42	45	3
No free health for British visitors	30	31	1
End EU pesticide regulations	24	35	11

Indeed, for the most part they do not. Table 7 suggests that, at most, Yes voters may be slightly more likely to support the possible components of a 'soft' Brexit, while Table 8 indicates that they are also a little less likely to back the potential constituents of a 'hard' one. But this still means that at least three in five of those who voted for independence are opposed to the maintenance of freedom of movement, while they are no more likely than those who voted No to back free trade. Meanwhile, when it comes to whether the UK should concede free movement in return for free trade (see Table 9), what distinguishes Yes from No voters is not that they are more likely to be inclined to back such a deal. Rather, it is that Yes voters are both more likely to say that Britain *definitely* should make such a deal and that it *definitely* should not, suggesting that their views on the subject are more polarised than those of their No counterparts.

Table 9 Attitudes towards allowing EU freedom of movement in return for UK access to free trade by Independence Referendum Vote

Allow people from EU freely to come and live and work in return for allowing UK firms to trade freely with the EU?	Independence Referendum Vote	
	Yes	No
	%	%
Definitely should	38	26
Probably should	26	36
Probably should not	16	23
Definitely should not	19	13

These findings would certainly seem to raise some questions about the SNP's decision to seek a second independence referendum on the grounds that the UK government intends to pursue a harder Brexit than is in Scotland's interests. The shape of Brexit is not an issue that unites and distinguishes the body of Yes supporters the SNP and their allies brought together in September 2014. It is thus not immediately obvious that it is likely to be an issue around which a more persuasive Yes campaign can be fought second time around.

ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION?

For nationalists, the divergent outcome of the EU referendum provided the clearest possible illustration of its argument that for so long as it remains part of the UK Scotland is always at risk of having its 'democratic wishes' overturned by votes cast in England. In contrast, for unionists it is perfectly 'democratic' for Scotland to respect the outcome of a ballot conducted across a UK state of which it is part. We might therefore wonder where public opinion in Scotland stands on this debate. Do people think that Scotland should be expected to leave the EU in the wake of the outcome of the referendum – or not?

To address this issue, respondents were asked:

> **Which of these statements comes closest to your view?**
>
> **Scotland is an integral part of the UK and so should accept the UK-wide vote to leave the EU**
>
> **Scotland is a nation and so should not have to leave the EU when a majority of Scots voted to stay**

Even though as many as 62% voted to Remain, opinion proves to be almost perfectly evenly divided on this issue. On the one hand, 47% say that Scotland should accept the UK-wide vote to leave the EU, while, on the other hand, just slightly more, 51%, believe that the country should not have to leave. It would seem that neither nationalists nor unionists can claim that their interpretation of the Brexit vote is accepted by the vast majority of voters in Scotland.

Rather, as we might anticipate, people's views on this subject reflect their attitude towards independence in the first place. As many as 72% of those who voted Yes in September 2014 think that Scotland should not have to leave the EU, while just 28% believe the UK-wide vote should be accepted. In contrast, 68% of No voters feel that the UK-wide vote should be accepted while only 30% are of the opposite view. Even so, this still means that a substantial minority of

Yes voters believe Scotland should have to leave while three in ten No voters reckon it should not have to do so. In both cases these voters' views about Brexit might be thought to be at odds with their past vote on the independence question.

Much of the explanation lies in the fact that people's views about Scotland and Brexit also reflect how they voted in the EU referendum. As many as 77% of those who voted for Leave think that Scotland should now leave the EU, while only 23% believe that it should not have to do so. Meanwhile, 62% of those who supported Remain feel that Scotland should not have to join the rest of the UK in leaving the EU, while 37% feel that it should. The combined effect of these two considerations, people's attitudes towards independence and their vote in the EU referendum, is illustrated in Table 10, which shows the proportion who say that Scotland should not have to leave the EU broken down by both how people voted in the September 2014 independence referendum and the choice they made in the EU referendum.

Table 10 Support for saying Scotland should not have to leave the EU by Independence Referendum Vote and EU Referendum Vote

% say Scotland should not have to leave the EU	EU Referendum Vote	
Independence Referendum Vote	Remain	Leave
Yes	91	36
No	39	10

Those who voted Yes to independence and to Remain in the EU are almost unanimous in believing that Scotland should not have to leave the EU. Conversely, those who voted No to independence and to Leave the EU are equally united in believing the country should be leaving the EU along with the rest of the UK. In contrast, those Yes voters who voted to Leave and those No voters who backed Remain are more divided in their views. However, they are not simply evenly divided. Rather, a little under two in five think that Scotland should not have to leave – and therefore around three in five believe that it should. Thus the balance of opinion on this issue amongst Yes voters who voted to Leave appears to be influenced primarily by their choice in the EU referendum, while No voters who backed Remain seem to place more emphasis on their support for the UK than their vote in the EU referendum. Between them these figures suggest that it will not be easy for the SNP to change many minds on Scotland's constitutional status by referring to the iniquity of the country being forced to leave the EU. Many a Yes voter who voted Leave is quite content with Brexit while many a No voter who voted Remain accepts that Scotland should now leave the EU.

ARE ATTITUDES DIFFERENT?

But if, as seems likely, Scotland leaves the EU along with the rest of the UK, is it the case that voters north of the border want a different kind of Brexit from the rest of the UK, as the Scottish Government appears to believe? In Table 11 we compare the proportion in Scotland who supported the various potential components of a 'soft' Brexit (as previously reported in Table 1) with the equivalent proportion for voters across Britain as a whole (Curtice, 2016; Curtice, 2017a). The difference between the level of support in Scotland for each item and that in the whole of Britain is shown in the final column.

Table 11 Comparison of Level of Support for Possible Contents of a 'Soft' Brexit in Scotland and in Great Britain

% in favour of	Scotland	Great Britain	Difference (Scotland-GB)
Free trade	93	88	5
Mobile phone charges	75	71	4
Swimming water	75	73	2
Airline delays	73	68	5
University research	72	67	5
Bank passporting	65	65	0
Common fisheries*	52	60	-8

* In Great Britain question was asked in September/October 2016

The picture portrayed in the table is one of modest differences rather than markedly different views. For the most part, people in Scotland are simply a little more likely to back free trade, university research collaboration, or any of the various items of consumer and environmental protection about which we asked. Moreover, all of these are issues where a clear majority of voters across Britain as a whole are in favour too. Meanwhile, there is one instance, the granting of reciprocal fishing rights, where people in Scotland are somewhat less likely than are voters elsewhere to support continued collaboration.

Much the same picture emerges when we compare, as in Table 12, attitudes towards the various possible components of a 'hard' Brexit. Voters in Scotland are typically just a little less likely to back these proposals. There is certainly no suggestion here that voters in Scotland have markedly different views about the future of migration between the UK and the EU – indeed on one of our migration items, that is, whether British citizens who wish to move to a EU country should have to apply in the same way as anyone from outside the EU, voters in Scotland are (albeit statistically insignificantly) more likely to back the proposal. Meanwhile the lower level of support for EU labour market regulation that exists in Scotland (as we saw earlier) is largely but a mirror image of the position across Britain as a whole. The same is true of the markedly low level of support for ending the ability of British citizens to secure urgent health care while abroad and for ending adherence to EU regulations on the use of pesticides.

Table 12 Comparison of Level of Support for Possible Contents of a 'Hard' Brexit Scotland and Great Britain

% in favour of	Scotland	Great Britain	Difference (GB-Scotland)
Treat British emigrants like non-EU migrants	72	70	-2
Customs checks	65	69	4
Treat EU immigrants like non-EU migrants	64	68	4
No migrant welfare	59	63	4
End maximum working hours limits*	46	53	7
End minimum annual leave	44	45	1
No free health for British visitors	30	37	7
End EU pesticide regulations	31	35	4

* In Great Britain question was asked in September/October 2016

Attitudes towards the UK's future financial relationship with the EU are also little different in Scotland from those in the rest of the UK. At 61%, the proportion of people across Britain as a whole who think the UK should only contribute to those EU programmes in which the UK participates, is only a little below the 65% who take that view in Scotland. Where it might be said that there is some difference of note, albeit still not a large one, is in reported willingness to concede freedom of movement in return for free trade. Table 13 reminds us of our finding at Table 3 that in Scotland 61% feel that the UK either 'definitely' or 'probably' should be willing to do such a deal. At the same time it shows that across Britain as a whole the equivalent figure is 54%. While people in Scotland are apparently almost as likely as those in the rest of the UK to support immigration control, they are perhaps a little more willing to concede the point if that were to be the only way to secure an adequate arrangement on free trade.

Table 13 Comparison of Attitudes in Scotland and Great Britain towards allowing EU freedom of movement in return for UK access to free trade

Allow people from EU freely to come and live and work in return for allowing UK firms to trade freely with the EU?	Scotland	Great Britain
	%	%
Definitely should	30	22
Probably should	31	32
Probably should not	21	24
Definitely should not	16	20

SHOULD SCOTLAND BE DIFFERENT?

People's attitudes in Scotland towards Brexit are then, for the most part, only a little different from those across Britain as a whole. But even if there were more substantial differences of outlook, that still leaves open the question of whether people in Scotland feel that any differences should be reflected in the country having a different relationship with the EU than the rest of the UK - such as, for example, in respect of immigration and membership of the single market as suggested by the Scottish Government (Scottish Government, 2017).

To assess public opinion in Scotland on this issue we asked the following two questions:

1. Which of the following statements comes closer to your view about immigration after Britain has left the EU?

The rules on immigration from the EU should be the same in Scotland as they are in England and Wales

The rules on immigration from the EU should make it <u>easier</u> for someone from the EU to come to live in Scotland than in England and Wales

The rules on immigration from the EU should make it <u>harder</u> for someone from the EU to come to live in Scotland than in England and Wales

2. Which of the following statements comes closer to your view about the rules on trade after Britain has left the EU?

The rules on trade with the EU should be the same in Scotland as they are in England and Wales

The rules on trade with the EU should make it <u>easier</u> for a EU company to do business in Scotland than in England and Wales

The rules on trade with the EU should make it <u>harder</u> for a EU company to do business in Scotland than in England and Wales

There seems to be relatively little support for having different rules in Scotland from those in the rest of the UK. Both in the case of immigration and of trade, just under two in three (62%) say that the rules should be the same. Meanwhile, just 34% envisage that the rules on trade should make it easier for a EU company to do business in Scotland (2% believe they should make it harder), while just a quarter (25%) reckon the rules on immigration should make it easier for someone from the EU to come to Scotland (while 12% believe they should make it harder).

As we might anticipate, those who voted No in the independence referendum are especially likely to endorse the idea that the rules on EU immigration and trade should be the same in Scotland as in the rest of the UK (see Table 14). Much the same is true of those who voted Leave. In contrast, there is majority support amongst those who voted Yes for a more liberal set of rules on trade, though at 56% the level of support is much lower than the 83% support amongst No voters for having the same set of rules on trade. But even Yes voters are relatively reticent about endorsing the idea of having more liberal rules on immigration – just 39% back this idea, while there is a noticeable minority of Yes voters (16%) who would like the rules in Scotland to be tougher.

Further analysis (see Appendix) reveals that support for having a closer relationship with the EU on immigration and trade is primarily the preserve of those who voted both Yes to independence and to Remain in the EU, though even on immigration only 61% of this group are in favour of a more liberal immigration policy. Those Yes voters who voted to Leave the EU are no more likely to be attracted to that idea (14% are in favour) than those who voted No in the independence referendum.

Table 14 Attitudes towards Scotland having different rules on EU immigration and trade by EU Referendum Vote and Independence Referendum Vote

(α) immigration

	EU Referendum Vote		Independence Referendum Vote	
	Remain	Leave	Yes	No
Immigration rules in Scotland should be	%	%	%	%
Same as in England & Wales	55	72	43	76
Easier than in England & Wales	36	7	39	14
Harder than in England & Wales	8	20	16	10

(β) trade

	EU Referendum Vote		Independence Referendum Vote	
Trade rules in Scotland should be	%	%	%	%
Same as in England & Wales	54	74	38	83
Easier than in England & Wales	43	21	56	16
Harder than in England & Wales	1	3	5	*

* Less than 0.5%

CONCLUSION

Scotland may have voted very differently from England and Wales in the EU referendum, but this does not necessarily mean that it wants a very different kind of relationship with the EU than does the rest of Britain. As is the case elsewhere in the UK, it appears that voters both want free trade and an end to freedom of movement, a combination that the UK government says that it wishes to secure, though whether it will be able to do so remains to be seen. While Remain supporters are less concerned about immigration than Leave voters, even amongst this group at least a half back a more restrictive regime. True, there seems to be widespread support for various forms of EU consumer and environmental protection, but much of this mood is to be found in the rest of Britain too. Equally, a relative lack of enthusiasm for EU labour market regulation also seems to be not dissimilar to the position elsewhere.

Meanwhile, support for Scotland taking a markedly different path in the wake of Brexit certainly appears to be much lower than might be anticipated from the 62% vote to Remain. The one in three or so of Yes voters who voted to Leave not only mostly think that Scotland should leave the EU along with the rest of the UK, but are also not especially keen on the country having a closer relationship with the EU than the rest of the UK, and especially so in respect of immigration. Meanwhile a majority of those No voters who voted for Remain believe that Scotland should accept the UK-wide result of the referendum and are inclined to the view that the rules on EU trade and (especially) immigration should be the same in Scotland as in England and Wales. It would seem that for most No voters their support for the Union matters more than their preferences in respect of the EU. As a result, opinion on whether Scotland should have to leave the EU along with the rest of the UK is quite finely balanced, much as it is on the question of whether Scotland should be an independent country in the first place (Curtice, 2017b).

Against this backdrop it seems that, at present at least, any second attempt to try to persuade voters to vote for independence because of the allegedly unsatisfactory shape of the Brexit deal that the UK is attempting to secure with the EU is unlikely to prove particularly persuasive. Those who voted Yes in 2014 are on balance barely any keener on having a closer relationship with the EU than are those who voted No. Meanwhile, many a No voter who voted Remain appears to be willing to accept that Scotland is going to have to leave the EU. What both Yes and No voters want from Brexit is much the same as what voters elsewhere in Britain want. Perhaps if the UK government fails to meet their aspirations, voters might think again about what relationship Scotland should seek to secure with the EU. But in truth if it does fail Scotland may well not be unique in re-evaluating its options.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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APPENDIX

Table A1: Support for making it easier for someone from the EU to come to Scotland than to England and Wales, by Independence Referendum Vote and EU Referendum Vote

% should be easier to come to Scotland	EU Referendum Vote	
Independence Referendum Vote	Remain	Leave
Yes	61	14
No	18	1

Table A2: Support for making it easier for a EU business to do business in Scotland than in England and Wales, by Independence Referendum Vote and EU Referendum Vote

% should be easier to come to Scotland	EU Referendum Vote	
Independence Referendum Vote	Remain	Leave
Yes	74	38
No	19	7